Book description
This is the first book on Iraq by a British intelligence official
involved in the process that led to Britain taking part in the 2003
invasion. As the former head of the UK Defence Intelligence Staff's
nuclear, biological and chemical section, Brian Jones is ideally
placed to pronounce upon the way in which Britain was taken to war and
the way in which the intelligence reporting on Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) was manipulated to justify Saddam Hussein's removal
from power. Jones calls on his own experience and knowledge, a variety
of leaked documents, and the expert testimony given to a series of
inquiries, including the current Chilcot inquiry, to examine how and
why Tony Blair and George W. Bush, managed to deceive their
legislatures and their electorates into believing that Iraqi WMD was a
real threat that could attack the West within 45 minutes. He describes
how Blair and Bush sought to use subsequent inquiries to cover up
their own culpability in the deception, in order to facilitate
re-election and keep their jobs. In conclusion, Jones pulls together
the lessons that should have been learned in relation to both the use
of intelligence to justify policy-making and with regard to broader
international issues of security and governance.
BRIAN JONES, now retired, was formerly in the scientific and
technical directorate of the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and was
responsible for analysing all intelligence on nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons. He was the first British intelligence official to go
public on the misuse of intelligence to justify the war.
