Book description
The Vietnam War has been analyzed, dissected, and debated from multiple
perspectives for decades, but domestic considerations-such as partisan
politics and election-year maneuvering-are often overlooked as
determining factors in the evolution and outcome of America's longest
war. In Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party,
and the War, Andrew L. Johns assesses the influence of the Republican
Party- its congressional leadership, politicians, grassroots
organizations, and the Nixon administration-on the escalation,
prosecution, and resolution of the Vietnam War. This groundbreaking work
also sheds new light on the relationship between Congress and the
imperial presidency as they struggled for control over U. S. foreign
policy. Beginning his analysis in 1961 and continuing through the Paris
Peace Accords of 1973, Johns argues that the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon
administrations failed to achieve victory on both fronts of the Vietnam
War-military and political-because of their preoccupation with domestic
politics. Johns details the machinations and political dexterity
required of all three presidents and of members of Congress to maneuver
between the countervailing forces of escalation and negotiation,
offering a provocative account of the ramifications of their decisions.
With clear, incisive prose and extensive archival research, Johns's
analysis covers the broad range of the Republican Party's impact on the
Vietnam War, offers a compelling reassessment of responsibility for the
conflict, and challenges assumptions about the roles of Congress and the
president in U. S. foreign relations. Andrew L. Johns, assistant
professor of history at Brigham Young University, is coeditor of The
Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the
Cold War. He lives in Provo, Utah.
