Book description
According to Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris, "Flight has
been part of the human dream for aeons, and its military application
has likely been the dark side of that dream for almost as long."
In the twentieth century, this dream and its dark side unfolded as the
air forces of the world went to war, bringing destruction and
reassessment with each failure. Why Air Forces Fail examines the
complex, often deep-seated, reasons for the catastrophic failures of
the air forces of various nations. Higham and Harris divide the air
forces into three categories of defeat: forces that never had a chance
to win, such as Poland and France; forces that started out victorious
but were ultimately defeated, such as Germany and Japan; and finally,
those that were defeated in their early efforts yet rose to victory,
such as the air forces of Britain and the United States. The
contributing authors examine the complex causes of defeats of the
Russian, Polish, French, Arab, British, Italian, German, Argentine,
and American air services. In all cases, the failures stemmed from
deep, usually prewar factors that were shaped by the political,
economic, military, and social circumstances in the countries. Defeat
also stemmed from the anticipation of future wars, early wartime
actions, and the precarious relationship between the doctrine of the
military leadership and its execution in the field. Anthony
Christopher Cain's chapter on France's air force, l'Arm?e de l'Air,
attributes France's loss to Germany in June 1940 to a lack of
preparation and investment in the air force. One major problem was the
failure to centralize planning or coordinate a strategy between land
and air forces, which was compounded by aborted alliances between
France and countries in eastern Europe, especially Poland and
Czechoslovakia. In addition, the lack of incentives for design
innovation in air technologies led to clashes between airplane
manufacturers, laborers, and the government, a struggle that resulted
in France's airplanes' being outnumbered by Germany's more than three
to one by 1940. Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for
further research, Why Air Forces Fail provides groundbreaking studies
of the causes of air force defeats.
""The book contains many interesting insights and
interpretations. Why Air Forces Fail is an excellent introduction to
the study of military failure in general and air forces in
particular."" -- Francis M. Coan, Journal of America's
Military Past
